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Commission
Communications
The Federal
("FCC" or "Commission"), created by the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), 2 was given explicit authority to regulate the radio frequency spectrum. 3 In granting licenses for the use of a broadcast
frequency, the Commission was required to determine whether the use would serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."" Further, the Commission was to ensure that the frequencies were
distributed in a "fair, efficient, and equitable"

manner.8
Prior to conferring this regulatory authority on
the FCC, Congress had enacted legislation, as
needed, to regulate the assignment and use of the radio frequency spectrum.' The first major problem
requiring such government action involved spectrum
frequency interference.' The Radio Act of 1927, enacted to resolve interference problems, created the
Federal Radio Commission, which was given regulatory authority over all spectrum, except that owned
by the government.8 The passage of the 1934 Act
consolidated all regulatory authority over the spectrum, but Congress still struggled with legislation
that strove to apportion the limited amount of available spectrum9 to meet the disparately high demand

Bart Ziegler et al., Building a Wireless Future, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 5, 1993, at 56, 60.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
'
IId. §§ 301-399. "The radio spectrum is part of the larger
electromagnetic spectrum, which is the entire range of all radiating energy. The spectrum is a natural resource which is nondepletable but finite." H.R. Rep. No. 19, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1993). Radio frequency spectrum is used for wireless communication systems, including television broadcasting, radio, and
cellular telephones. Id. For a detailed discussion of the workings
of the radio frequency spectrum, see Jora R. Minasian, Property
Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221, 223-27 (1975).
" 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988). Section 307(a) states in full
that "[t]he Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter, shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter." Id. The 1934 Act does not include
guidelines to judge what constitutes "public interest" and the
Commission has broad discretion in this area. See Comprehensive Policy Review of Use and Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum, Notice of Inquiry and Request for Comments,
54 Fed. Reg. 50,694, para. 42 (1989)[hereinafter NTIA Policy
Review]. See also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 599 (1981) (holding that a policy statement issued by the
FCC concerning rulings on applications for license renewal or
transfer met the public interest standard as it was consistent
with "the Commission's traditional preference for achieving diversity in entertainment programming through market forces");

see also FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96-97
(1953) ("the Commission is not required to make specific findings of tangible benefit," but should at least show there will be
some beneficial effect); see also National Broadcasting Co., Inc.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943) ("In each case that
comes before it the Commission must still exercise an ultimate
judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the 'public
interest, convenience, or necessity.' ").
5 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1988). This section states, in pertinent part, that "[iln considering applications for licenses, and
modifications and renewals thereof ... as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the
same." Id.
For an historical overview of the FCC's authority to regu6
late the radio frequency spectrum, see Michael C. Rau, Comment, Allocating Spectrum by Market Forces: The FCC Ultra
Viresl 37 CATH. UL. REV. 149 (1987).
' Id. at 153. "When two or more radio transmitters use the
same frequency at the same time, interference will be perceived
on that frequency by a radio receiver capable of hearing both
stations. Neither station will be heard satisfactorily." Id. at 153
n.28.
8 Id. at 154 (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 6, 44 Stat.
1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
§ 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 70-79 (1986)).
9 Rau, supra note 6, at 154; NTIA Policy Review, supra
note 4, para. 6.

"The biggest players in the computer, communications,
and information industries anticipate a new stage in technology, which, as the microprocessor did in the 1980s, will
create vast new markets and new fortunes. They see empires in the air."'
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for licenses for new telecommunications technologies.' 0 Consequently, the focus shifted from controlling the licensees that used the spectrum to distributing the licenses through a "fair, efficient, and
equitable" process."
In regulating the radio frequency spectrum and in
attempting to maintain the policy goals associated
with the use and distribution of the spectrum as a
valuable and scarce resource, two views have
emerged characterizing the unique attributes of this
public asset." The first view compares spectrum licenses with trusteeships where licensees serve as
trustees to the public interest and in return are given
use of the valuable public spectrum. 8 The second
view applies a market system approach where, although not part of the 1934 Act, competition is seen
as fostering the public interest goal through private
ownership of the public resource.' Thus, licenses
are viewed as public trusts, but also have attributes
indicative of private property. 5 "In theory, the Government, serving as guardian of the airwaves,
awards licenses to promote public goals; in practice,
it gives away what is valuable property that can be
bought and sold like real estate."'
These divergent views of the nature and use of the
spectrum, however, appear to have narrowed. With
emerging technological innovations and the increasing demand for this valuable resource, the focus has
shifted from the trusteeship approach to the private
property approach. While public interest goals still
pervade the system, the financial incentives inherent
in this resource have gained momentum in the process of awarding spectrum licenses.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
("1993 Budget Act")' 7 is a recent development that

'0 NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 6. One of the
goals of the 1934 Act was to encourage the birth of new technologies. Kurt A. Wimmer, Netting Federal Revenues from Thin
Air - Issuing Spectrum Licenses by Auction, COMM. LAW.,
Summer 1993, at 11.
"
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 5.
"
Rau, supra note 6, at 149-50. See also NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 4; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 399 (1969) ("It is enough to say that [spectrum] is
...of considerable and growing importance whose scarcity impelled its regulation by an agency authorized by Congress.").
The Rau article cited herein discusses these approaches for the
purpose of examining the FCC's regulation of the use to which
allotted spectrum is put. The approaches, however, are also relevant to the ideas further discussed here regarding the process by
which licenses are awarded.
13
Rau, supra note 6, at 149.
14 Id. at 150. This approach is purely theoretical because in
delineating the purpose of the Communications Act of 1934, it
clearly was emphasized that licenses for frequencies were
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clearly accentuates the valuable financial attributes
of the radio frequency spectrum. President Clinton's
Budget Act, passed by Congress on August 10, 1993,
gave the FCC, for the first time, the authority to
auction licenses through a competitive bidding process.' 8 The process is projected to raise over $10.2
billion in revenue over the next five years. 9
Critics of competitive bidding, however, are concerned that the development of the latest technologies
will be hindered if there is a waiting period prior to
the implementation of the competitive bidding process.2" Furthermore, opponents worry that small and
minority-owned businesses will not have the opportunity to participate in the bidding process. 2' Such
effects essentially would violate the fairness and public interest goals of the 1934 Act.2 Nonetheless,
Congress has given the FCC the authority to establish auction rules and procedures. 23 Therefore, in order to maintain the purpose of the 1934 Act and still
be of financial benefit to the United States, the competitive bidding process must be implemented with a
focus on both the public policy and revenue
incentives.
This Comment discusses the financial incentives of
the competitive bidding process in light of the public
policy goals embodied in the Communications Act of
1934. Part I examines the spectrum assignment process used prior to the competitive bidding legislation,
focusing on the inefficiency of these processes to meet
the demands of emerging telecommunications technologies that require licenses. Part II studies the
competitive bidding process included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Part II then reviews the legislative action that was essential to the
final language of the competitive bidding amendment
awarded only for the use, not the ownership of spectrum. 47
U.S.C. § 301 (1988); see also FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) ("The policy of the Act is
clear that no person is to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license.").
'8
Rau, supra note 6, at 149-50.
'
Edmund L. Andrews, System to License Airwaves Needs
Reform Critics Assert, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al.
" Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be
'"
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1)).
19 FCC Adopts Rules to Expand Wireless Communications
Services, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A-26.
20
See discussion infra part II.C.2.
21 Id.
's See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
M Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309()(3)).
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to the 1934 Act. Finally, Part II focuses on the ultimate advantages and disadvantages of the system.
Part III analyzes how the auction process will work
and focuses on who will benefit from competitive
bidding. Part IV concludes that while implementation of the auctioning process is premised on raising
much needed revenue, this process will not curtail
the public policy goals of the 1934 Act. Instead, the
public first will benefit directly from a fair and efficient licensing process when new services are implemented more quickly. Second, the public will enjoy
the indirect benefit of financial gains to the U.S.
Treasury.

1. Comparative Hearings
Mutually exclusive applications for broadcast services are subject to a comparative hearing process, in
which the FCC analyzes a variety of factors to determine to whom a broadcast license should be given. 2"
The comparative hearing process is not based on
clearly established criteria.2 9 The Commission tends
to give preference, however, to applicants who plan
to manage the station and live in that community,
thus ensuring that licenses are awarded to applicants
who are committed to providing a service to the public.30 Minorities and first-time licensees also are
given preference in the comparative hearing
3

I. THE NEED FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING

process.

The FCC currently uses either comparative hearings 4 or lotteries2 5 to award licenses to mutually exclusive applicants. 26 Both processes, however, have
become too inefficient to accommodate the increasing
demand for licenses and have resulted in unfair financial gains to private parties.2 7

The comparative hearing process is not without
some flaws. First, the nature of the process has
prompted nonsensical challenges by other applicants
to incumbent licensees during the license renewal period, where the challenger simply contests the renewal to extract large settlements from the renewing
applicant. 2 In response, the FCC has restricted settlements by forbidding any form of payment in exchange for an applicant's withdrawal of an application without Commission approval.3 3 Second, the
comparative hearing process can be extremely
lengthy and burdensome.3 ' In addition, it can be

24
47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988); see Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945) (holding that "where two bona
fide applications are mutually exclusive the grant of one without
a hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity which
Congress chose to give him.").
25 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1988); see generally In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from
Among Competing Applicants for New AM, FM, and Television Stations By Random Selection (Lottery), Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 4 FCC Rcd. 2256 (1989)[hereinafter Lottery
NPRM](describing the need for lotteries as opposed to comparative hearings).
2
"Two or more timely filed applications for the same frequency or for frequencies whose use would electronically interfere with each other are generally referred to as 'mutually exclusive.'" Lottery NPRM, supra note 25, para. 5 n.4.
27
Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12; see also Lottery NPRM,
supra note 25, para. 51.
2"
In re Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Policy Statement,
I F.C.C.2d 393, 394-400 (1965)[hereinafter ComparativeHearings Policy Statement]. Comparative hearings have been used
only for licensing broadcast services. Wimmer, supra note 10, at
11.
29
Comparative Hearings Policy Statement, supra note 28,
at 393. "The various factors cannot be assigned absolute values,
some factors may be present in some cases and not in others, and
the differences between applicants with respect to each factor are
almost infinitely variable." Id. See also Johnston Broadcasting v.
FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (stating that "there
are no established criteria by which a choice between the appli-

cants must be made"). The important factors the Commission
listed included: diversification of control of the media of mass
communications, full-time participation in station operation by
owners, proposed program service, past broadcast record, efficient use of frequency, character, and other factors that are relevant to the particular case. Comparative Hearings Policy Statement, supra note 28, at 394-400; see also West Michigan
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 604-05 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (discussing the six factors), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027
(1985); see TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (stating that the public interest "is a broad concept, to be
given realistic content."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
o Andrews, supra note 16, at A7.
s, Id. There is no longer a female preference policy in the
licensing process as this was found to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Lamprecht v. FCC,
958 F.2d 382, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Preference, however, is still
given to applicants based on race, ethnicity or surname. See
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (holding
that "minority ownership policies bear the imprimatur of longstanding congressional support and direction and are substantially related to the achievement of the important governmental
objective of broadcast diversity.").
22
Andrews, supra note 16, at A7.
32 47 U.S.C. § 311(d)(1) (1988). There are administrative
sanctions for violations of this chapter. See id. § 312(a).
34
The Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of
1993: Hearings on S.335 Before the Subcomm. on Comm. of
the Senate Comm. on Com., Science and Transp., 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1993)[hereinafter S.335 Hearings](prepared state-

A. Radio Spectrum Licensing Procedures of the
Past: Inefficient Systems and Windfalls for Private
Parties
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some time before the station is constructed and in
full operation, resulting in idle spectrum, and therefore undermining the public policy benefits." From
a financial perspective, comparative hearings diminish valuable FCC administrative assets, and impose
high litigation expenses on applicants who are challenged.36 Some argue, however, that comparative
hearings are effective because the FCC can structure
the broadcasting industry so that licenses are
awarded to those who are serious about developing
stations that serve the public needs.3
Overall, comparative hearings provide an equal
opportunity for all license applicants to be heard and
help ensure that the license will be used to benefit
the public.38 However, the process may be too burdensome for applicants and may not result in any
corresponding benefit to the public when the choice
of the final licensee is "based on minimal differences
lacking any public interest significance. ' ' so
2. Lotteries
The FCC uses lotteries as another method of issument of Thomas P. Stanley, Chief Engineer at the
FCC)("Comparative hearings are slow and are of limited utility
in picking licenses for services where one qualified would-be service provider is not clearly better than another."); see also Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12 ("Comparative hearings, however,
have been criticized . . . for requiring hair-splitting speculative
judgments about which applicant is the most qualified.") (citing
Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.)
(Levanthal, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969)).
"[Ilit is highly questionable whether our elaborate and costly
comparative process actually results in a material benefit to the
public. This is especially true in those cases where the comparative distinction between a winning and losing applicant, both of
whom are basically qualified, is marginal." Lottery NPRM,
supra note 25, para. 2. See also id. paras. 5-17 for a detailed
discussion of the extensive process.
'5 Andrews, supra note 16, at A7 (noting the laxity of the
rules for applicants since, "[i]n addition to allowing those who
win licenses freedom to sell them after a year, the rules let almost anybody buy them, short of a convicted felon, a foreigner or
someone who owns another station in the same market.").
3' Lottery NPRM, supra note 25, para. 2.
37
Andrews, supra note 16, at A7 (quoting Media Access
Project Director Andrew Jay Schwartzman). See also S. 335
Hearings, supra note 34, at 28 (prepared statement of Edward
0. Fritts) (emphasizing that "[iun a world of broadcast spectrum
auctions, only those who already have large financial backing
would have a real chance to win licenses, and I fail to see how
that situation assures that the nation's broadcast service continues to serve the needs of our citizens.").
38
Comparative Hearings Policy Statement, supra note 28,
at 394 (noting that every applicant has a right to a full hearing
and that one of the main objectives of the process is to provide
the best service to the public).
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ing licenses,40 "adopted both to expedite the assignment process and to choose fairly among applicants."4' 1 Lotteries are used for a variety of services,
including cellular telephones, low power television
and specialized mobile radio ("SMR") spectrum."
The lottery is a random selection procedure,
whereby applicants are chosen at random manually
or by computer.43 As compared to the comparative
hearing process, lotteries have been considered "substantially superior."" Lotteries are easier to facilitate because the process is much simpler and more
objective than comparative hearings.'" Thus, with
lotteries, licenses can be awarded faster, which in
turn expedites the implementation of new services
from which the public can benefit. 6 Furthermore,
lotteries are less expensive for applicants, so anyone
interested in applying is not hindered by a lack of
capital.4
Nevertheless, lotteries have shortcomings as well.
This random selection process encourages speculation, where one applies for a license with no intention of using it and sells it for the highest price soon
after issuance."' "The results of lotteries are 'second"' Lottery NPRM, supra note 25, para. 51.
40
47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1988).
41
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 43. In 1989, the
FCC proposed to expand the lottery procedure to include licensing of radio and television. See Lottery NPRM, supra note 25,
para. 1. However, the FCC later decided, agreeing with the majority of commenters, that the better approach would be to reform the comparative hearing process because any efficiency
gained may cause a decline in the quality of the broadcast licensees and services. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules
to Allow the Selection from Among Competing Applicants for
New AM, FM, and Television Stations By Random Selection
(Lottery), Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 4002, para. 3 (1990) (proceeding
terminated).
4" NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 43. An SMR is
"[a] radio system in which licensees provide land mobile communications services (other than radiolocation services) in the 800
MHz and 900 MHz bands on a commercial basis to entities
eligible to be licensed under this Part, Federal Government entities, and individuals." Private Land Mobile Radio Services, 47
C.F.R. § 90.15 (1992).
48
Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12.
"" Lottery NPRM, supra note 25, para. 32.
4,
Id. para. 33(a)-(b).
46 Id. para. 33(c).
'"
Id. para. 33(d)-(e); Andrews, supra note 16, at Al. For
example, the government does not charge a fee for cellular telephone licenses, whose market value is about $42 billion. Id. at
A7. Lotteries were expected to be less costly for the FCC, but
because there is no fee or strict requirements for filing, the FCC
must sort through thousands of applications, increasing administrative costs. Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12 n.8.
48 Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12. In re Implementation of
Section 3090) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding,
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ary' auctions with a windfall that should have gone
to the U.S. Treasury going to the lucky ticket
holder."4' 9 For example, in 1990, a rural cellular license was issued in Columbia County, Wisconsin
through a lottery and 190 days after issuance, it sold
for $62.3 million, with the FCC noting, " '[t]he public received none of this revenue.' -5 In addition, as
with comparative hearings, losing applicants often
file petitions to deny the grant of licenses.6 1 These
petitions only lead to hearings on the issue, again using valuable FCC administrative resources and impeding service to the public.6"
Ultimately, lotteries are considered better than
comparative hearings for the ease in awarding licenses." Lotteries, however, appear to misappropriate the profits made from license sales, and because
of the relaxed application process, unfairly affect applicants who intend to provide a service that will be
beneficial to the public."'
B. Technological Developments in the Telecommunications Industry: Comparative Hearings and Lotteries are Ineffective
The expanding technological world, with innovations from cellular phones to handheld computer systems, has made the competition for spectrum licenses
so intense that comparative hearings and lotteries
can neither efficiently meet the demand for spectrum,
nor control who applies for and what is ultimately
done with the licenses.5 In addition, with current
legislation freeing more government spectrum to accommodate new technologies, "6 lotteries and comparFirst Report and Order, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 700, para. 4
(1994)[hereinafter First Report and Order]. "[Llotteries have
proved problematic as a method of issuing licenses .. .they attracted some applicants that had little interest in building and
operating high-quality communications systems." Wimmer,
supra note 10, at 12.
" S. 335 Hearings,supra note 34, at 44 (prepared statement
of Robert S. Foosaner).
50
Sealed Bids to Predominate; Spectrum Auction Rule Issued by FCC, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 14, 1993, at 7.
51
Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12.
52

Id.

Lottery NPRM, supra note 25, para. 32.

See generally Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12 (noting the

"'private auctions' " that take place and the thousands of applicants that file having no interest in providing communications
services to the public).
" See generally S.335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 43-44
(prepared statement of Robert S. Foosaner) (noting that compar-

ative hearings are time consuming and costly and that lotteries
invite speculation).
" Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6001(a), 107 Stat. at 380 (to be

ative hearings neglect the financial value of the spectrum that could benefit the federal budget."' "The
value of spectrum, as an invisible resource, is sometimes overlooked. Yet over the years, demand for
spectrum for both commercial and governmental
purposes has continued to increase."58
The radio frequency spectrum is in great demand
as it is used for a wide variety of business enterprises
in the United States, including radio and television
broadcasting, cellular telephones, taxi dispatch services, air traffic control, law enforcement, public
safety and national security." Consequently, "the
U.S. spectrum management system 60 should be reviewed, and potential improvements developed and
evaluated, particularly in light of increases in the demand for spectrum, rapidly changing developments
in spectrum-related technology, and the new forms
of spectrum management implemented in other
countries. '6 1 An excellent example of how demand
can exceed supply is in specific geographical areas,
mainly urban areas, where frequency bands become
extremely congested."

Senate Bill 3353 was drafted

specifically to address this problem of excess demand
or "shortage of spectrum for a host of new technolo' The bill also was expected to "boost Amerigies." 64
can industry, technology, and competitiveness." 6 5
House Committee reports also have noted "that
the lack of available spectrum is stifling the introduction of new technologies. The Committee anticipates
that the passage of this legislation will reverse this
situation, and allow the Commission to allocate additional frequencies to new and innovative technologies." 6 6 Even with the abundance of existing services
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 901).

" Andrews, supra note 16, at Al.
6' NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 3.
59 Id.
'o Spectrum management is a twofold process, first the FCC
must decide to what use the band should be put and then decide
who should be licensed to use it. Id. para. 18. A discussion of the
use to which a band should be put is beyond the scope of this
Comment, which focuses solely on the process of determining
who should be licensed to use the band. See generally Rau,
supra note 6 (describing the process by which the FCC determines the use of frequency bands).

NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 6.
IId. para. 33.
S 5. 335, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
part 1I.B.2.
64 S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34,
Thomas B. Stanley, Chief Engineer at the
IId.
n H.R. Rep. No. 19, 103d Cong., 1st

See discussion infra
at 8 (statement of
FCC).
Sess. 4 (1993). The

market for wireless data services is expected to equal that of personal computers, which is roughly 30 million units a year. Zie-
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that use frequencies, the licensing process still should
continue to "encourage efficient technologies" to benefit consumers.6 7 Clearly, new legislation was necessary to accommodate technological advances and the
increasing need for radio frequency spectrum
licenses.68
C.

Competitive Bidding Proposals

The widespread dissatisfaction with the current licensing processes for some services has prompted
several major proposals that offer competitive bidding as a profitable and efficient alternative. At various times in the past thirty-four years "conservative
economists" and Republican administrations have
proposed the use of auctions.6 9
Competitive bidding proposals are premised upon
a market-based approach.7 0 The market system concept-focused on competition-has several advantages. First, it provides an incentive to use the spectrum efficiently and economically because spectrum
licenses would be awarded at high prices.7 1 Next, it
eliminates inefficient and time-consuming procedures
by simply awarding licenses to the highest bidder.7
This in turn, ascertains the market value of the spectrum.7 ' Finally, and perhaps the most significant advantage is that competitive bidding can raise federal
revenue. 7 ' Thus, with an auction process, license
awards would be based on the financial value of the
gler et al., supra note 1, at 56.
17
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 8; see Wimmer,
supra note 10, at 14.
6"
"The frequency allocation process must be more responsive if it is to accommodate increasing demand and complexity of
spectrum use as technology evolves." NTIA Policy Review,
supra note 4, para. 29.
6"
Wimmer, supra note 10, at 11 (citing R.H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1959)
(economists' auction proposal) and Mark Fowler & Daniel
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEx. L. REV. 207 (1982) (examining the first recognition of an
auction proposal by an executive administration)). In 1985,
then-Chairman of the FCC Mark Fowler proposed competitive
bidding. Ervin S. Duggan, Spectrum Auctions and the Common
Good, Remarks of Ervin S. Duggan, Commissioner, Federal
Communications Commission Before the TeleStrategies Spectrum Auctions Conference, Washington, D.C., at 2 (Nov. 1,
1993) (transcript on file with the FCC). Another alternative that
has been suggested was the flexible radio service proposal. Rau,
supra note 6, at 152. Such a system would allow bands to
change services on their own as the marketplace changes, with
no governmental approval needed. Id. at 168. Economic incentives would then be the main focus. Id. Spectrum assignment initially would require a hearing process to assign licenses, but after that, transfers would be through a buying and selling process
by licensees on their own and would ultimately have the same
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spectrum, not on subjective administrative decisions
as to the appropriate qualities of each license
applicant. 5
The disadvantages of handling spectrum licensing
through a market-based approach, however, include
the potential to stray from public policy goals and to
create a monopolization effect. 7 Specifically, the unfairness inherent in this approach has caused critics
to fervently oppose such a process because the only
licensees would be those who could afford to pay the
highest price.7 Public interest goals of fairness and
equal opportunity embodied in the 1934 Act, without safeguards, essentially would be removed from
the spectrum licensing process by barring applicants
who lack the financial resources, yet are committed
to providing a public service.7 8 On the other hand,
comparative hearings and lotteries tend to highlight
spectrum rights as transferable property rights because licenses are sold for a profit soon after being
awarded. 9 Consequently, private auctions already
constitute a major source of income for private parties when the spectrum's financial value could be
shared publicly through the U.S. Treasury."
In 1992, Fleet Call, Inc., one of the largest SMR
system operators, urged the FCC to consider competitive bidding for unused bands of frequency spectrum
for SMR networks. 8 An auction system used in the
spectrum assignment process, they argued, would
"assure that scarce spectrum resources are made
effects as the current system. Id. at 182. The FCC should be
more involved so profits go to the U.S. Treasury rather than to
private parties.
70 Rau, supra note 6, at 172. See also The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, Administration Policy
Statement, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,030 (1992)(where the call
for action was specifically to promote market principles in spectrum distribution).
71 NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 55.
72
Id.
7' A market-based approach "would allow users to determine how spectrum should be allocated and assigned based on
their perceived needs as expressed by willingness to pay, thus
bringing demand into equilibrium with supply." Id.
7' Rau, supra note 6, at 173.
76
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 54.
76 Rau, supra note 6, at 173-74. The other problem with a
market-based approach is that some services are limited as to
their market because only certain frequencies can be assigned for
some purposes. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 69, at 21013.
77 NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 57.
78
Id.
79
Id. para. 61.
so

Id.

81 S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 41 (prepared statement
of Robert S. Foosaner).
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available to those who will put them to their highest
and best use" and would raise revenue for the U.S.
Treasury instead of for speculators. 82 The FCC dismissed Fleet Call's Petition for Rule Making on the
issue of competitive bidding although the Private Radio Bureau stated, "[w]hile we support many of
Fleet Call's objectives, we currently have no explicit
authority to hold spectrum auctions." ' s3 Thus, support for auctions was widespread, but the process
was continually rejected.8 4
In 1993, however, the support for auctions gained
momentum and Congress began to consider competitive bidding legislation more seriously. Supporters
asserted that "the effective use and management of
the spectrum will increasingly play a critical role in
promoting U.S. economic well-being and global competitiveness." 6 Thus, the importance of competitive
bidding as a means of distributing spectrum-based licenses finally was recognized.
II. COMPETITIVE BIDDING FINALLY ACCEPTED
A. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Section 6002.
1.

The 1993 Budget Act and Future Regulations

President Clinton's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 199387 gave the FCC, for the first time,
the authority to assign frequencies through a competitive bidding process.8 8 The legislation amends
section 309 of the 1934 Act. 8 Section 309(j)(3) provides the FCC with the authority to implement regulations governing the competitive bidding process and
specifically states that these regulations "shall include safeguards to protect the public interest in the
use of the spectrum .

. .""

In addition, four main

objectives are to be met:
(A) the development and rapid deployment of new tech-

nologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural areas, without admin-

istrative or judicial delays;
(B) promoting economic opportunity and competition and

82

Id.

In re Policies and Rules for Licensing Fallow 800 MHz
Specialized Mobile Radio Spectrum Through a Competitive
Bidding Process, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC
Rcd. 8590, para. 1 (1992).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
88 Duggan, supra note 69, at 3.
86
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 3.
87 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. at 312.
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be
82

ensuring that new and innovative technologies are readily
accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive
concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses
among a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned
by members of minority groups and women;
(C) recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the
public spectrum resource made available for commercial
use and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods employed to award uses of that resource; and
(D) efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.9'

The objectives clearly attempt to balance financial
incentives and efficiency goals with equal opportunity and fairness to all applicants. The question,
however, is whether the FCC's final regulations on
competitive bidding can achieve these objectives.
In order to meet the objectives of paragraph (B)
above, the Commission's regulations must include
payment schedules and specific calculation methods
to determine the amount of each payment.9" Also,
performance requirements have to be standardized so
services can be delivered soon after licensing, thus
ensuring that no spectrum will lie fallow and that
new technologies will be implemented faster." Next,
the regulations must distribute bandwidth assignments equally among geographic areas, provide financial opportunities to all types of license applicants, and ensure investment in and faster
disbursement of new services, thereby maintaining
"the public interest, convenience and necessity" standard. The regulations also have to provide bidding
opportunities to small businesses, rural telephone
companies, and businesses owned by women and minorities.94 Finally, the regulations must mandate full
disclosure of any license transfers and promulgate
antitrafficking rules, thereby preventing "unjust enrichment as a result of the methods employed to issue licenses and permits."' 5
Furthermore, section 6002 of the 1993 Budget Act
emphasizes that the competitive bidding process
should not change the provisions of the 1934 Act regarding spectrum allocation standards and procedures, take away any Commission authority in regulating or revoking licenses, transfer any rights other
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309j)(1)).
"B Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 387.
80
Id. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(3)).
91
Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)-(D)).
IId. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(A)).
IId. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(B)).
Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D)) (the FCC
is to "consider the use of tax certificates, bidding preferences,
and other procedures.").
95 Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(E)).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

than what the 1934 Act already provides, or lessen
the public interest obligation of the Commission.96
Also, "the Commission may not base a finding of
public interest, convenience, and necessity ...

on the

expectation of Federal revenues from the use of a
system of competitive bidding" when awarding licenses. 9" Thus, the competitive bidding system appears to be structured specifically to balance both financial and policy objectives.
Auctions are to be used for license applications
that meet three requirements. 98 First, the applications must be mutually exclusive.99 Next, the application must be for an initial license or construction
permit.' 0 0 Finally, the use of the license must be for
a service provided to subscribers for compensation. 0 '
If these requirements are not met, an alternative system of awarding licenses most likely will be used,
either comparative hearings or lotteries.
The FCC's authority to implement competitive
bidding included the reassignment of government
spectrum.'
Section 6001 of the 1993 Budget Act
empowers the Secretary of Commerce to take 200
megahertz of spectrum that had been allocated to the
federal government, which is currently not in use,
and transfer it to the FCC which can then award it
to the private sector.' 03
2. The Financial Stimulus and Efficiency Incentives of Competitive Bidding
The revenue-generating opportunities of competitive bidding are overwhelming.'0 4 The Clinton ad90 Id. at 389-90 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(6)).
91 Id. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(B)).
" Action in Docket Case-FCC Proposes Rules to Implement Competitive Bidding to Award Spectrum Licenses (PP
Dkt. No. 93-253), FCC News, Sept. 23, 1993, at 1.
99 Id. See also Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at
388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1)).
"o Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309()(1)).
101 Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(A)).
102
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 391 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(10)).
103 Id. at 380, 385 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 901).
10,
Auctions have been projected to raise $10.2 billion. FCC
Adopts Rules to Expand Wireless Communications Services,
DAILY REP.

FOR

EXECUTIVES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A-26. The

FCC is not required to meet an estimate in raising revenue
through section 6002. Currently, all of the revenue will go to the
U.S. Treasury, minus a portion that will be retained by the
FCC for the costs of implementing the competitive bidding process. Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(8)(A)-(B)). Commissioner Duggan,
however, has suggested that the money be used "also to advance
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ministration supported competitive bidding largely
for the projected revenue.'
President Clinton stated
that " '[today many multimillion-dollar industries including television and radio - are built around the
free use of a scarce and valuable federal resource.' "106

The second main consideration for the Clinton administration and the reason for the auction legislation was to speed up the licensing process and elimi07
nate speculators that pervade the lottery system.1
The Clinton administration did not want to alter the
licensing period or the renewal conditions for any
spectrum-based service, nor did it plan to provide
new property interests in the spectrum. 08 Rather,
the goal was to promote a more fair and efficient licensing process for some services, so that the public
will benefit from the use of those services and ultimately benefit from the financial value of the resource through the revenue collected by the U.S.
Treasury.'0 9
B. Competitive Bidding's Journey Through Congress: Perfecting the Language
Although it is unclear whether the goals of the
competitive bidding legislation will be met, it is apparent from the legislative language that section
6002 attempts to balance revenue and policy objectives. The legislation concentrates mainly on achieving a compromise between encompassing the revenue
capabilities of the process and ensuring that small,
minority and rural businesses with advanced comother important social goals." Duggan, supra note 69, at 8.
105
Ed Warner, Commerce Secretary Strongly Endorses
Spectrum Auctions, FCC REP., Mar. 24, 1993, at 11, 12.
100 Randy Sukow & Geoffrey Foisie, Clinton Puts Fifth Estate on Alert; Broadcasters Cautious About Clinton Economic
Plan, BROADCASTING, Feb. 22, 1993, at 4 (quoting President
Clinton). Among the reasons for the Clinton administration's
support of competitive bidding were: "efficiency of the licensing
process and use of spectrum; financial return to US taxpayers;
and spectrum assignment process improvement without altering
the rights and duties associated with the services license [sic]."
Spectrum Auctions: A Look at the Commerce Department's
Views, SPECTRUM REP., Apr. 1993, at 6; see also S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 5 (letter from Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce to Senator Daniel K. Inouye) (emphasizing
the Commerce Department's support of spectrum reallocation
and competitive bidding).
107
Warner, supra note 105, at 12; see Spectrum Auctions
Appear to be a Foregone Conclusion, MOBILE PHONE NEWS,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 3.
oi See Sukow & Foisie, supra note 106, at 4.
'09 Spectrum Auctions: A Look at the Commerce Department's Views, SPECTRUM REP., Apr. 1993, at 6.
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munications technologies will still have opportunities
to obtain necessary spectrum licenses.11 ° The language of the legislation, when completed, was paramount in determining whether these two issues could
be resolved in a competitive bidding process."' 1 Essentially, the goals are to implement a process that
will raise money for the government as well as serve
policy concerns of a fair and efficient distribution of
licenses by providing opportunity to all applicants
and by increasing public access to new services.
1. The House Debate
House Bill 707, the Emerging Telecommunications Act of 1993, initiated debate in the House of
Representatives that eventually led to a separate bill
on competitive bidding.1 12 The purpose of House
Bill 707 was to reallocate spectrum available for government licenses to private parties in order to encourage the development of new communications
technologies. 1 3 The bill concluded that much of the
government spectrum-approximately forty percent
of the entire electromagnetic spectrum-was being
used inefficiently, thereby undermining the public
interest mandates of the 1934 Act.' 4 Reallocating
these frequencies, it was proposed, could "produce
significant economic returns.""' The bill reflected
some legislators' concerns that if the Commission did
not have more spectrum to license, the communications industry would suffer significant setbacks, including a reduction in the development and sale of
new telecommunications technologies; a hindered
and inefficient U.S. telecommunications system; a decrease in the availability of frequencies for state and
local safety services, including police, fire and emer110
II

112

Wimmer, supra note 10, at 11.

Id.
Competitive bidding was recommended by the United

States Department of Commerce, Office of the General Counsel,
H.R. Rep. No. 19, supra note 3, at 16, but it was not included
in House Bill 707. See H.R. 707, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1993
was sponsored by Representatives John Dingell and Edward
Markey of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Id. at 1.
The House passed the bill on February 2, 1993. Id.
18 H.R. Rep. No. 19, supra note 3, at 2.
14
"a

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
IId. at 2-3.

H.R. 857, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1993).
PCS Industry Speaks Out on Auctions, PCS NEWS, Apr.
29, 1993, at 3, 4. William deKay, Chairman of the board of
directors of Telocator, argued that profits for the PCS industry
would be stifled by the payments those licensees would have to
make after the auctions, thus considerably affecting the taxes
117

's

gency services; and a less productive and international competitive system for the U.S. economy.""
The competitive bidding issue was considered later
in House Bill 857.'" A major concern during hearings on competitive bidding in the House was
whether the revenue projections were worth hindering the introduction of new communications services
or worth hampering employment opportunities." 8
The House also debated over the extent to which the
auction implementation process could accommodate
all types of services and the special needs of each service provider." 9
The House Telecommunications Subcommittee
Chairman, Edward Markey, insisted that the auctioning proposal should ensure that small and minority-owned businesses have an opportunity to
bid. 20 At the first hearing on the bill, Chairman
Markey specifically supported an auction bill that
would satisfy financial concerns, but did not adversely affect communications policy objectives. 2 '
Chairman Markey stated, "[m]y goal in this process
is to come up with an auction bill that gets the administration the revenue it seeks and does
not tram1 22
ple upon sound communications policy.'
Several personal communications service ("PCS")
advocates who testified at the competitive bidding
hearings disapproved of spectrum auctions. 2 "This
[auction] issue will have a negative impact on the
personal communications industry as it exists today,
on the incredible promise of future wireless services
and on the benefits which a diverse and highly competitive personal communications services industry
can bring to the American economy," noted William
deKay, Chairman of the Board of Telocator.1 24 Similarly, R. Craig Roos, President of Personal Comcollected from PCS profitmakers. Emerging Telecommunications
Technologies: Hearings on H.R. 707 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Com., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 107-8 (1993) [hereinafter H.R. 707
Hearings]. Another concern brought out at the hearings was that
large corporations with existing services could bid on new spectrum simply to thwart the entrance of new technologies developed by smaller companies or individuals into the market because the smaller companies or individuals would compete with
the existing services. Id. at 133 (testimony of R. Craig Roos,
CEO of Personal Communications Network Services of New
York, Inc., a Locate Company).
"" As Opposition Falls, Auctions Appear on Fast Track to
Approval, ADVANCED WIRELESS COMM., Apr. 28, 1993, at 5.
"" H.R. 707 Hearings, supra note 118, at 81-82 (opening
statement of Chairman Edward Markey).
121
Id. at 82.
122

*
124

Id.

Id. at 85-190.
Id. at 110 (statement of William D. deKay).
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munications Network Services of New York, Inc.,
stated that "[i]f Congress authorizes the FCC to
award radio frequency spectrum licenses by competitive bidding, I fear that small, innovative telecommunications companies will become a part of this nation's history rather than a part of its future."'2 5
2.

The Senate Debate

Comparable competitive bidding legislation also
was debated in the Senate. Senate Bill 335, introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye, reallocated 200
megahertz of government spectrum to private use
and permitted the FCC to test auction thirty
megahertz of this spectrum.' 2 6
The Senate legislation on competitive bidding goes
as far back as January 1989 with the Spectrum Assignment Improvements Act of 1989, Senate Bill
170.127 The purpose of this bill was to "introduce
fair market principles into the system whereby portions of the audio spectrum are distributed, which
will give the Federal Government the opportunity to
realize the full value of these assets."' 2 8 The attributes of this bill were quite similar to those accepted
later in Senate Bill 335 and those eventually approved in the 1993 Budget Act.' 29 Senate Bill 170
authorized competitive bidding for licenses of unassigned spectrum when there are mutually exclusive
applicants who would submit statements of intent
prior to bidding and after the license was
awarded.'
The Commission also was given authority to implement the competitive bidding regulations.'
The Senate debated similar issues addressed in the
House of Representatives regarding the competitive
bidding process. At hearings on the competitive bidding issue, Thomas P. Stanley, Chief Engineer for
the FCC Office of Engineering and Technology,
128

Id. at 127 (statement of R. Craig Roos).
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S. 335, supra note 63, at 1, 26.
S. 170, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).

123

135 Cong. Rec. S524-25 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989)(state-

126

ment of Mr. Gramm). Mr. Gramm noted that "American tax-

payers should be the beneficiaries of the sale of spectrum licenses, and setting the market price of that license through a

competitive bidding process can assure that they are." Id.
19
Compare S. 170, supra note 127 with S. 335, supra note
63, at 26 and Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)).
5' 170, supra note 127, at 2.
S.
131

Id. at 5.

See S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 9-10 (statement of
Thomas P. Stanley).
132

133

Id.
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supported the bill and suggested ways in which
small businesses could participate in the process. 82
He suggested deferred payments or payments over
several years, favorable-term loans, setting aside
spectrum only for small businesses to bid on, or setting aside spectrum to be assigned in a manner other
Mr. Jay Kitchen, the President
than auctioning.'
of the National Association of Business and Educational Radio, was concerned with the unfair advantage large companies would have over small creative
groups or individuals who were not established in
the communications industry. 3 4 On the other hand,
Mr. Robert S. Foosaner, the Senior Vice President
for Government Affairs of Fleet Call, Inc., praised
spectrum auctions, highlighting that the system
would ensure that those who win the licenses would
make the best use of the resource and that the revenue raised clearly would benefit the federal government. 38' Mr. Wayne Perry, Vice Chairman of McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., also supported
auctions, pointing out that competitive bidding "can
facilitate the development of th[e] advanced wireless
infrastructure."'3 6
3. The Final Language of the House and Senate
Bills Included in the 1993 Budget Act
The House and Senate telecommunications committees spent weeks working on compromise language for the Licensing Improvement Act of 1993,
later to be incorporated into the President's budget
proposal." 7 The 1993 Budget Act included the reallocation of 200 megahertz of spectrum for new services. 38 The final budget bill also added language
that permitted the FCC to collect regulatory fees
that were projected to raise $80 million per year for
the FCC.' 9 In addition, the 1993 Budget Act gave
the FCC authority to use the auctioning process un134
See id. at 38-9 (Mr. Kitchen preferred "an equitable
outcome for all").
'3 Id. at 41 (excluding from the competitive bidding process
broadcasting, radio astronomy, amateur radio services, and public safety services).
136
Id. at 22 (noting that the rapid development of the cellular industry and its creation of jobs and new services as part of
the advanced wireless infrastructure).
131
State's Cellular Regulation Fate Lies in Congress'
Hands, TELEPHONE NEWS, May 31, 1993, at 1.
"' Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6001(a), 107 Stat. at 380 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 901).
1"9
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6003(a), 107 Stat. at 397 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 901). This language was not in either
the House or Senate version of the bill.
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til September 30, 1998, and required that a report be
submitted to Congress from the Commission. "' This
report must detail such findings as how much money
was raised, how quickly the new services were publicly implemented, and what objectives were met, as
well as set forth financial projections.' 4 ' Therefore,

with the passage of the 1993 Budget Act on August
10, 1993, " " competitive bidding for wireless services
became an attainable goal for the FCC, the telecommunications industry, and the public.
C.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Competi-

tive Bidding
1. Advantages Clearly Outweigh the Disadvantages
Advocates of competitive bidding have emphasized
the advantages of spectrum auctions in awarding licenses. The most often cited benefit is the revenue
raising capability of the competitive bidding process.
In a Notice of Inquiry concerning the use and management of the spectrum, " 3 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration noted
that the government supplies the spectrum, therefore
the government should retain the proceeds on that
which the public uses."' Thus, financially valuable
public resources should benefit the public as a whole,
through the U.S. Treasury, rather than be concentrated in a few private parties. In terms of the 1934
Act, if the public benefits from the financial value of
the spectrum, the "public interest" standard will be
served. " 5
Another advantage to the use of a spectrum auc14
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 392 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(11)-(12)).
141 Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309()(12)).
14
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. at 312.
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 2.
144
Id. para. 68. Several others have noted the financial capabilities of the spectrum and have voiced concerns about where
the money should go. See The Emerging Telecommunications
Technologies Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2965 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Com., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 27 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission)(stating, "the 200 MHz of spectrum which
H.R. 2965 proposes to transfer to non-Government use could be
valued as high as $100 billion"); see also Randy Sukow, Spectrum Auction Argument Begins Again, BROADCASTING, Feb. 8,
1993, at 12 (quoting Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), in that "it seems
foolish to give away a valuable resource such as the spectrum
reserve"); see also S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 12 (statement of Thomas P. Stanley)(emphasizing that "competitive bidding could raise significant new revenues for the Treasury"); see
also Warner, supra note 105, at 12 (noting that "the administra-

tioning system is that licenses most likely will be
awarded to those who will put the spectrum to its
most efficient use."" Auctions "would allow users to
determine how spectrum should be allocated and assigned based on their perceived needs as expressed
by willingness to pay, thus bringing demand into
equilibrium with supply."" The competitive bidding process requires applicants to establish the service, determine demand for the service, and secure
themselves financially to make a proper bid."'
"[T]he goal should be to use bidding as a mechanism
to ensure that licenses are awarded to those who will
use them most efficiently.""' As a result, services
will be available to the public much sooner if the
license winner is the one who actually will provide
the service as opposed to having another sale, subsequent to the awarding of a license, to the highest
bidder. " The "public convenience, interest and necessity" would be hindered in subsequent sales because the service would be held back and the revenue
that could have been enjoyed publicly would be in
the hands of a private party. 15 '
2. The Disadvantages of Competitive Bidding
Compensated for in the Final Language
A major concern for opponents of the competitive
bidding process is that those who cannot afford to
bid, but are still innovative producers of services that
require spectrum licenses, will have little opportunity to implement new products. 52 With comparative hearings, there were non-economic factors to examine in awarding spectrum licenses-factors with
tion sees auctions as a needed revenue-raiser").
145
47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988).
14
In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 8 FCC Rcd. 7635, para. 34 (1993)[hereinafter Competitive Bidding NPRM].
NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 54 n.47.
148 Wimmer, supra note 10, at 12-13. As Wimmer predicted, "[e]xperts will emerge to assist the uninitiated in making
these essential assessments . . . ." Id. at 13. The time, effort and/
or capital necessary to participate in the competitive bidding
process is likely to discourage applicants who do not intend to
actually utilize the spectrum they purchase. Id. "On balance,
however, it is likely that an auction environment will discourage
most less sincere and less financially committed applicants." Id.
140
Id. at 11; see also S. 335 Hearings, supra note 34, at 12
("[T]he winning bidder is likely to be keenly interested in developing the most efficient and effective (and most prompt) use of
the spectrum.").
180 Competitive Bidding NPRM, supra note 146, para. 34.
151
Id.
16
Wimmer, supra note 10, at 11.
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public policy goals in mind.' The risk of excluding
some applicants solely because of financial barriers
would be unfair and contrary to the policy goals of
the 1934 Act.' 54 Thus, if the auction legislation was
passed blindly, with no safeguards for equal opportunity, the financial attributes would overtake the
policy objectives.'
Another major concern is that implementation of
the auctioning process will delay the introduction of
new products. " While the process is being implemented, wireless services will have to wait for licenses. Such a delay could affect the economy because fewer new jobs will be provided and there will
be less taxable earnings of service providers.157 In response to this concern, Congress put a time limit of
180 days after passage of the 1993 Budget Act to
implement competitive bidding regulations for PCS
and a 270 day limit as to when PCS competitive bidding must begin.'

58

Although the 1993 Budget Act

mandates these time limits, as of the date of this Article, the auctioning of PCS services has not begun
and may be delayed until 1995.""
Despite the allure of the revenue-generating potential of spectrum auctioning, the public policy
goals of the 1934 Act must remain paramount. With
the possibility that the use of a competitive bidding
process could result in unfairness to a select group of
providers or delay the introduction of new services,
... NTIA Policy Review, supra note 4, para. 57; see also
discussion supra part I.A.1.
154 "Traditional policy goals of fostering opportunities for
small businesses and minority-controlled entities also could fall
by the wayside in a pure auction environment." Wimmer, supra
note 10, at 11.
"0 In response to this concern, the 1993 Budget Act mandated equal opportunity to obtain licenses for all applicants and
prohibited consideration of expected revenue in awarding licenses. Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389-90 (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309()(4)(D), (7)(A)).
"' H.R. 707 Hearings,supra note 118, at 114 (statement of
William D. deKay); see also id. at 144 (statement of Wayne
Schelle, Chairman of American Personal Communications) (noting that "any delay in the timing or retarding of the scope of
PCS will necessarily lessen its value, reduce the revenues raised
through auctions, and diminish our opportunities to gain the
lead in the immense international PCS market").
151
Id. (stating that "[y]ou also have to balance the revenue
to be received from auctions against the significant negative costs
to the economy which will result from the delay in introduction
of new services").
"I Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(d)(2)(A)-(B), 107 Stat. at
396-7.
Sandra Sugawara, FCC May Rethink PCS, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1994, at DI1.

'eo
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See supra part II.A.
Action in Docket Case-FCC Adopts Rules to Imple-
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the 1993 Budget Act requires the FCC to implement
spectrum auctioning regulations that focus on the
public policy goals, while minimizing the potential
detriments that may result from the use of such a
process. 60 The question then becomes whether the
regulations will, in reality, meet these objectives.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE COMPETITIVE

BIDDING LEGISLATION
A.

The FCC's Competitive Bidding Rules

On March 8, 1994, the FCC adopted a Second
Report and Order announcing rules to implement
the competitive bidding process.'' The rules were
fairly general, but will be supplemented by future
report and orders." 2 The results of the rules are expected to hasten the introduction of new technologies
and services, encourage efficiency in the use of spectrum, provide opportunities for all applicants to participate in the bidding process, and ensure that the
inherent financial value of the spectrum is enjoyed
by the U.S. Treasury as opposed to private parties in
post-licensing transactions.' 6
The regulations will apply to mutually exclusive
applications for an initial license or construction permit where the services to be provided entail the
transmission or reception of communications services
ment Competitive Bidding to Award Spectrum Licenses (PP
Dkt. No. 93-253), FCC News, Mar. 8, 1994, at 1. This Second
Report and Order was released on April 20, 1994. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Second Report and Order in PP Dkt. No. 93253, FCC 94-61 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Second Report and
Order]. The Commission's First Report and Order on competitive bidding discussed the problem of unjust enrichment with lotteries because the 1993 Budget Act required the FCC to address
this problem. First Report and Order,supra note 48, paras. 1, 4.
The Commission concluded that there is no need to establish
new lottery rules at this time because a limited number of services will use lotteries in the future, ones which do not cause the
unjust enrichment problem. Id. para. 10.
"I See Second Report and Order, supra note 161, para. 68.
"In order to provide the maximum flexibility and address the
Congressional mandate to 'design and test multiple alternative
methodologies under appropriate circumstances,' the Commission established a broad menu of competitive bidding methods
that it can employ to auction licenses with different characteristics." FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
at 2.
"I FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
at 2. The Commission believes that the new rules will implement a process that will "increase competition for spectrumbased services" in comparison with the licensing procedures used
in the past. Id.
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to subscribers for compensation.' These eligibility
requirements are part of the competitive bidding
statutory requirements.' 6 5 As a result of these requirements, the Commission decided that "[miost
spectrum-based common carrier services, some private mobile radio services, some private fixed services, and commercial mobile radio services will be
subject to competitive bidding, assuming the other
statutory criteria are met."' 66 As each service may
require a different method of bidding, the auction
design will be selected "on a service by service basis." 6 The Commission concluded that awarding licenses to those that would value the licenses most
highly, would best achieve the goals of promoting economic growth, enhancing access to telecommunications services, and recovering the financial value of
the spectrum.

1 68

One of the goals of the 1993 Budget Act's competitive bidding amendment is to provide an opportunity for all entities to participate in the bidding process.' 6 9 To provide opportunities to small businesses,
businesses owned by women and minorities, and rural telephone companies, the Commission adopted
specific preferences to ensure that these groups can
participate in the bidding as designated entities.'7 "
Specifically, small businesses, including those owned
by women and minorities, will be allowed to pay for
licenses in installments over the license period.'
The Commission also may use set-asides 7 2 to ensure
that designated entities still have an opportunity to
bid.' 73 Another method is to use a bidding credit system for designated entities. ' 7 ' Although not adopted
as a main method of assisting designated entities, the
Second Report and Order,supra note 161, paras. 12, 20.
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1)-(2)).
"" Second Report and Order, supra note 161, para. 48. The
specific services the FCC discussed as subject to competitive bidding were: interactive video data service; PCS; and common carrier and commercial mobile radio services. Id. paras. 49-67.
167
FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
at 2.
6'
Second Report and Order, supra note 161, paras. 2, 70.
The Commission also noticed, however, that this conclusion was
subject to certain safeguards being established in the rules. Id.
para. 70.
169
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D)).
17
Second Report and Order, supra note 161, para. 229.
17
Id. para. 223. "Allowing installment payments is
184
168

equivalent to the government extending credit to the winner.
This would reduce the amount of private financing needed by a
prospective license, but it burdens the government with the risk
of default." Competitive Bidding NPRM, supra note 146, para.
69.
17I
Set-asides are where "certain designated spectrum blocks

FCC may also use tax certificates in combination
with some of the other methods' 7 5 Other options include royalty payments, innovator's preference, and
distress sales to designated entities, all of which the
FCC discussed and reserved as possible methods, but
chose not to adopt at this time.' 76 Future report and
orders will detail the specific procedure to be used
depending on each service. 77
Those eligible for the bidding preferences must fit
the Small Business Association's ("SBA") definition
of small businesses, which encompasses "all independently-owned businesses with a net worth not exceeding $6 million and an average net income after
two preceding years not
Federal income taxes for 17the
8
in excess of $2 million.'
Finally, to prevent unjust enrichment, transfer disclosure requirements were adopted to ensure that the
preference measures are not abused and to enable
the Commission to monitor the profits from the
transfer and sale of a license by the initial auction
winner.' 79
B.

Who Will Benefit from Competitive Bidding?

1.

The Objectives

While the legislature was careful to address both
the financial and policy concerns in the competitive
bidding process, and the final language appears to
have achieved a balance between these issues, the actual effect of the legislation will remain unclear until
the FCC conducts the auctions. It is apparent, howto be awarded in auctions [would be] open only to applicants
that fall under one of the definitions for the eligible entities
.. .." Competitive Bidding NPRM, supra note 146, para. 73.
178
Second Report and Order, supra note 161, para. 247.
174
Id. para. 241. With this method, eligible applicants
would receive a payment discount or credit for their bid where
they would pay only a certain percentage of their bid. Id.
175
Id. para. 253. Tax certificates would be issued on the
sale of stock interests to owners and investors of minority-owned
and controlled licenses as long as the entities are still owned and
controlled by minorities. Id. para. 249.
178
See id. paras. 252-7.
177
Id. para. 229.
17
FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
at 4. This definition may be modified for some services to be
included. Id. Those eligible as businesses owned by minorities or
women must have 50.1% equity ownership and 50.1% controlling interest owned by women or minorities. Id. at 5. Rural telephone companies, to qualify, must be independently owned, have
access lines of 50,000 or less and provide services to communities
of 10,000 or less inhabitants. Id.
179
Second Report and Order, supra note 161, paras. 258-59.
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ever, that the competitive bidding process has to meet
three major goals in order to effectuate the public
policy interests set forth in the 1934 Act, while still
meeting the financial objectives. The first goal is to
provide the U.S. Treasury with the revenue generated from the use of the public's radio frequency
spectrum.1 80 The second objective involves the policy
concern of meeting the public interest standard of the
1934 Act. The public will benefit from the financial
value of the spectrum when licenses are auctioned
and the proceeds are deposited in the U.S. Treasury, 81 as well as from the rapid deployment of new
services. 82 Finally, the third objective and another
policy consideration is the fair and efficient distribution of licenses. 8 All industry participants should
have an opportunity to bid and should benefit from a
process where licenses are not conditioned on waiting
for hearings or on luck. Who will benefit from the
competitive bidding process? If each of these objectives are established simultaneously, it is possible
that everyone can benefit.
2. Meeting the Objectives
First, the financial objective of the competitive bidding process clearly will be effectuated from the inception of the process. Currently, the revenue goes to
private applicants who sell licenses to the highest
bidder. 84 Once the auctions are controlled by the
FCC, the revenue will go mainly to the U.S.
Treasury. 8 8
The second objective is less elementary, yet still
within reach-the public benefits from the financial
gains to the U.S. Treasury and the faster implementation of new services. If the revenue is added to the
U.S. Treasury, the public will benefit economically
from a healthier budget that can aid public programs
or reduce the deficit. The public also will benefit
from the competitive bidding process with the faster
implementation of new services. 86 Licenses can be
awarded quickly through auctions as opposed to
180
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(A)).
... Id. See also id. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j)(2)(C)) (stating as one of the objectives of competitive
bidding, the "recovery for the public of a portion of the value of
the public spectrum resource made available for commercial use
and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods employed to award uses of that resource.").
182
Id.
at 389 (to- be codified at 47 U.S.C
§ 309(j)(4)(C)(iii)).
188
Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(B)).
184
H.R. 707 Hearings, supra note 118, at 81.
185
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be
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waiting for the outcome of a long hearing to determine the winning applicant. However, the process
was supposed to begin 270 days after the 1993
Budget Act was enacted, 87 but there has been a delay. 8 8 Thus, ihis objective already may have been
compromised.
It is the final objective that is the most troublesome, that is, ensuring that this economically-based
process will still provide equal opportunities to all
citizens who apply for a radio frequency license. The
"public convenience, interest or necessity" standard
certainly will not be served if advancements in communications technology are stymied because a less
wealthy innovator could not obtain a frequency for
his or her product. The 1993 Budget Act merely
"instructs the FCC to ensure that small businesses,
rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
women and minorities have the opportunity to participate in competitive bidding." '89 To accomplish
this, the FCC competitive bidding regulations must
ensure that these aforementioned groups have the
same opportunities to obtain spectrum necessary for
their services. 90 It is unclear whether the regulations
will assure these groups the opportunity to bid because the specific bidding provisions will be implemented on a service-by-service basis.1 9
Many commenters to the FCC's Competitive Bidding NPRM, supported the separate treatment of
designated groups, including Lightcom International,
Inc. ("Lightcom"), of Washington, D.C., a minorityowned and controlled telecommunications company. 192 Lightcom

was

"enthusiastic

about

the

FCC's proposal to disseminate licenses for [PCS]
among certain designated groups, including small
businesses, minority-owned businesses and womenowned businesses."' 9 3 The American Women in Radio and Television, Inc. ("AWRT") also supported
"a scheme of preferences for small businesses and
minority and female-owned businesses in the competitive bidding process including tax certificates,
spectrum set-asides, bidding preferences, and prefercodified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(A)).
"" Id. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)).
187
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(d)(2)(B), 107 Stat. at 396.
18

Sugawara, supra note 159, at D11.

Duggan, supra note 69, at 7; see also Pub. L. No. 10366, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j)(4)(D)).
190
Competitive Bidding NPRM, supra note 146, para. 73.
191 FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
188

at 4.
'"
Letter from David R. Smith, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC 1 (Nov. 10, 1993) (on file with the FCC).

193 Id.

19941
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ential payment terms. 194
Commenters placed particular emphasis on the
difficulties small, minority-owned and women-owned
businesses have in attaining capital that is necessary
to obtain licenses and other telecommunications services. 19 5 To compensate for this barrier, Lightcom
supported set-asides, installment plans and even programs where capital could be available for these
groups through various financial institutions.1 96
The SBA recommended that the preferred groups
be based on the SBA's small business definition. 97
These designated groups would receive some type of
special treatment in the competitive bidding process.
Most of these safeguards generally were carried
through in the Commission's Second Report and Order. 9 8 However, "[w]hether these proposed benefits
will survive and, if they do, whether they are indeed
the best way to create real opportunity for such persons and groups, cannot [be said] today." '99 Commissioner Duggan made an important point when he
said that giving smaller entities the opportunity to
compete "will hasten the actual arrival of PCS services especially outside major metropolitan markets.
It will also create new jobs ... in smaller communities throughout the United States." ' If this prediction is correct, the FCC certainly will have accomplished some of the competitive bidding goals of the
1993 Budget Act.
With the proper safeguards, competitive bidding is
an available regulatory scheme. While the policy
concerns should remain paramount, it is clear that
the financial incentives cannot be overlooked because
of the nature of the spectrum, the need for revenue
and the hope for facilitating communications services
to the public. Competitive bidding is important because it involves a public resource and any financial
gain should be shared by the public. Thus, competitive bidding can work or at least provide a broader
benefit from the financial value of the radio frequency spectrum.

194
Comments of American Women in Radio and Television,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in PP Dkt. No. 93-

253, at 3-4 (Nov. 9, 1993)[hereinafter AWRT Comments].
"AWRT is a non-profit, national organization of professional

women and men who work in radio, television, cable, broadcast
advertising, and other communications related fields." Id. at 1.
'9' Letter from David R. Smith to William F. Caton, supra
note 192, at 2.
19
IId.
'9
The definition states in part, that "a small-business concern, including but not limited to enterprises that are engaged in
the business of production of food and fiber, ranching and raising of livestock, agriculture, and all other farming and agricul-

V.

CONCLUSION

The competitive bidding amendment to the Communications Act is based on three major goals: 1) the
financial gain to the federal budget; 2) the fair, efficient assignment of licenses to satisfy the public interest; and 3) the rapid deployment of new services
to the public. The financial goals have merit, especially in light of the existing economic conditions, but
these incentives cannot supersede the original goals
embodied in the 1934 Act. Thus, "traditional public
interest considerations will continue to be paramount. But the procedural and economic changes
that will be provoked by an auction atmosphere will
have a lasting impact on the composition of the telecommunications industry."' 0 '
This Comment asserts that the focus on raising
revenue with spectrum auctions could trample on
communications policy. However, the shifting of revenue from private parties to the U.S. Treasury as a
result of the sale of spectrum licenses, the expedited
deployment of new services, and the assurance of
equal opportunities for all applicants through a more
fair, efficient and sensitive licensing method, will
promote the public interest. Congress debated the exact language of the amendment with industry experts
and, as it appears, ultimately satisfied both goals in
the language of the amendment. It is unclear, however, if the final process will completely achieve what
has been mandated in the 1993 Budget Act.
In the months to come, as the regulations promulgated by the FCC on competitive bidding are implemented, it will become clear whether both goals can
be met. For public policy reasons, the Act must be
complied with, although the ability to assist the
economy is equally important. New technology in
the telecommunications industry will benefit the
public if it is distributed as soon as possible. Furthermore, the government will benefit financially
through taxes collected on profits made from the sale
of these new services. As a result, meeting the budget
tural related industries, shall be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its
field of operation .... " 15 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1988); Letter from
Robert J. Moffitt, Associate Administrator for Procurement Assistance, United States Small Business Administration, to Office
of the Secretary, FCC 1-2 (Nov. 4, 1993) (letter on file with the
FCC).
199
FCC Adopts Competitive Bidding Rules, supra note 161,
at 4.
199

Duggan, supra note 69, at 5.

200

Id.

201

Wimmer, supra note 10, at 15.
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and upholding public policy goals is certainly possi-
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ble in a wireless world through competitive bidding.

